The Dictatorship of Fallacies
“Do not heed by whom a thing is said,
rather what is said.”
(Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., “Letter to Brother John, ‘De Modo Studendi’,”)
Those Who Fail to Learn the Lessons of History
Are Condemned to Repeat them!
(Patriarch Jacobus Maria DeJesus, D.D.)
Those that fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it.
(Winston Churchill, Speech to the House of Commons, 1948)
IF YOU do NOT know, or do NOT care, who Winston Churchill was, then it is obvious to the lovers of the Truth, that YOU are a VICTIM of the anti-History TERRORISTSwho have fomented the current anti-History hysteria!
The anti-History TERRORISTS are also Demonic Truth-Haters who want to subtly CONTROL YOU by trying to make YOU, and those who are like YOU, nothing more than de facto PRISONERS, but without the concentration camp barbed-wire via psychological warfare and the language of lies!
There has been a growing anti-History hysteria over the last few decades, lead by those fueled by an intense hatred of law and order as found in various countries of the world. Why? Because of the intense Demonic desire of world conquest by the worshippers of Satan, which Satanic hatred includes the total extermination of the legal citizens of various countries, most especially those in the United States of America, and various Western European countries, by the tidal waves of illegals who are nothing more than anti-immigrants and cleverly disguised quasi-terrorists of various categories, many of whom, ironically, so it seems, burn with an intense hatred of the country in which they currently illegally reside!
In the U.S.A. at least some High School American History text-books taught students about dictatorships. We have been informed by some Parents of High School Students that some High School American History text-books no longer teach anything about dictatorships, as well as many other historical facts such as the American Revolutionary War, the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, and ignore any mention of the founding Fathers of the United States Government.
Civics Class was mandatory by law to be taught to all American High School Students before they could graduate from High School, at least during the first part of the 20th Century. This required course taught High School Students about the American Government and their own duties and obligations of obeying its laws. Several sources have informed Us that this is still the law, but that some States now ignore this Federal law, due to certain anti-American politicians in their State Governments and various anti-American judges.
A worst Dictator was Hitler? I beat him. I pretty much won WWII and killed 60 million of my own people. Ya, Hitler loses - Stalin. (A summary of what the factual History records that Stalin did.)
In the U.S.S.R., from 1917 to 1990, primarily under Josef Stalin, over 60 million civilians were killed. This includes at least 6 million Ukrainians who died of starvation as the result of Stalin having all of the grain, grown in the Ukraine, shipped to Russia. Above photos provide proof.
Six million perish in Soviet Famine. Ukrainian Peasants' crops seized. Result: Both they and their animals starved to death. Note photos. (Chicago American, Monday, February 24, 1936).
University of Complete Brainwashing
Senior Class: Fallacies
Major: Blatant Lies
Minor -1: Deliberate Deception
Minor -2: Superficial Ambiguity
Graduate: Magna Cum Confusion
Fake News on, TV, Radio, Newspapers, Internet, etc.
How to Destroy the U.S.A.
The Only Real Antidote to Brainwashing
(Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., “Summa Theologica”,
First Part, Question 16, Article 5, On the Contrary.)
Second Historical Dictatorship
Observations on Historical Dictatorships
“Remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.” (President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Friday, January 20, 1961.)
[Editorial Commentary: A Personal Note: By the Most Holy Will, and Grace of God, We were so very fortunate to attend the Inaugration of President John F. Kennedy in person, and also to listen to his Inaugrural Address. We still clearly remember the above quote as if it just happened yesterday!
We also remember the blizzard of the previous night which extended into the very early morning hours of Friday, January 20, 1961, although the morning brought clear skies with the air temperature about 25 degrees.
The area in front of the U.S. Capitol building, which is directly across the street from the front of the U.S. Supreme Court building, was covered with ice as the result of the crowd walking on all of the snow which packed down the snow, and thus the snow/ice on which to stand and which, despite freezing feet, very few, if any, people left that area, until after the conclusion of the Inaugural Address, etc.]
Among other things, a fallacy is any violation of a logical principle disguised under a show or pretext of validity. It is also an argument which, while seemingly valid, really violates some logical principle. The chief synonyms for fallacy are sophism and paralogism.
Removed: The Fake Masks of Demonic.
What Are They Really Telling You?????
Example # 1
President Trump Responds to the Blatant Lies!
A Few More Examples of Demonic. .Demagoguery
Example # 1
President Trump Responds, Again:
1. A “presumptive
fallacy” is a fallacy which simply presumes, supposes, postulates,
pretends, assumes, and presupposes that the statement is True.
2. The “gratuitous expression fallacy” is a fallacy by which “anyone can say anything” and not offer any proof for what is said.
3. The “ipse dixit fallacy” which means that “He, himself, said it.” It is an arbitrary dogmatic statement which the speaker expects the listener to accept as being valid.
4. The “bare assertion fallacy”. The most basic way to distort an issue is to deny that it exists. This fallacy claims: “That’s just how it is.”
5. The “fait accompli fallacy” defends a proposition by bluntly asserting it as being a fait accompli - an “accomplished fact”; “a done deal”. This distorts the argument by opting out of it entirely because the best way to distort any issue is to deny that issue ontologically, i.e. deny that the issue even exists - therefore, there is no issue because the issue is nonexistent.
“6. A sophism or fallacy is an argument which, under the specious appearance of truth, leads to a false conclusion. The deception is caused either by some ambiguity in the expression, or by some confusion in the thoughts expressed.”
“3. An irrelevant conclusion, ignoratio elenchi, or missing the point, proves what is not in question, refutes what is not objected ; as when Evolutionists prove elaborately that the body of man resembles in various ways the bodies of brutes a fact which no sensible man denies.”
“4. The petitio principii, or begging the question, consists in taking for granted the point which is to be proved ; when this very point is used as a premise in the reasoning, the fallacy is called a vicious circle.”
“5. The fallacy of the false consequence, often called a non-sequitur, or want of sequence, is used when a conclusion is drawn which is not contained in the premises; e.g., ‘There exists a wonderful gradation in the perfection of plants and animals ; therefore the more perfect are evolved from the less perfect.’”
“6. The undue assumption, or false cause, non causa, pro causa [non-cause, for cause], assumes as a cause what is not a cause; as when the Reformation is assumed to be the cause of scientific progress. This fallacy often arises from the fact that mere priority in time is mistaken for causality; post hoc, ergo propter hoc (after this, therefore because of this).”
(Rev. Charles Coppens, S.J., A Brief Text-book of Logic and Mental Philosophy, New York, Schwartz, Kikwin & Fauss, “Logic, Book I. Dialectics”. Chapter II, Reasoning, Article 6, VI, Fallacious Reasoning; pp. 40-42.)
The First Universal Language is Truth.
The Second Universal Language is Lies.
“Some Souls, because of their negligence or Spiritual sloth, do not pass from the Age of Beginners to that of Proficients. These are Retarded Souls; in the Spiritual Life they are like abnormal children, who do not happily pass through the crisis of adolescence and who, though they do not remain children, never reach the full development of maturity. Thus these Retarded Souls belong neither among Beginners nor among Proficients. Unfortunately they are numerous.” (Father Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. [b. Auch, France 1877 A.D. - d. Rome, Italy, 1964 A.D.], who taught Dogmatic and Spiritual Theology for 53 years at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, the Angelicum, in Rome, “The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Prelude of Eternal Life”, Translated by Sister M. Timothea Doyle, O.P., Volume One, Part II, The Purification of the Soul in Beginners, Chapter XXXVII, Retarded Souls, page 461. B. Herder Book Co., 1948; emphasis added.)
“How did these Souls reach this state of tepidity? As a rule, two principal causes are indicated: the neglect of little things in the service of God and the refusal to make the sacrifices He asks.” (Ibid., p. 461.)
“In the service of God, things which seem small in themselves are great in their relation to our last end, to God, Who should be loved above all else. They are also great by reason of the Supernatural Spirit of Faith, Confidence, and Love which should make us accomplish them. If we acted thus, we would live from morning to night in the Presence of God, which is infinitely precious; and we would live by Him, by His Spirit, instead of living by the natural spirit in accordance with the inclination of egoism. Little by little there would grow up in us Zeal for the Glory of God and the Salvation of Souls. Unless we strive in this way, we may end by following the downward path of practical naturalism, allowing ourselves to be dominated by the more or less unconscious gross selfishness which inspires many of our acts”.
“The neglect of little things in the service of God leads rapidly to neglect of great things; for example, in the case of a Priest or Religious, it leads to the recitation of the Office without true piety, to scarcely any preparation for Mass, to saying Mass hastily or assisting at it without the requisite attention, to replacing Thanksgiving (after the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass) by the obligatory recitation of a part of the Office, so that all personal piety disappears and gradually gives place to piety that is, in a way, official and exterior. If a Priest were to follow this downward path, he would little by little become a mere functionary of God. He would end by treating Holy Things with carelessness, whereas, on the other hand, he would perhaps acquit himself with the utmost seriousness in those duties which assure his reputation as a Professor, Writer, Lecturer, or man of affairs. Gradually emphasis would be shifted from what is of the greatest moment in life to what is secondary. The Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, which perpetuates in substance on our Altars the Sacrifice of the Cross, and applies its fruits to us, is evidently the most serious and greatest thing in life for the Priest and the true Christian. A Mass well Celebrated or well heard with a Spirit of Faith is far superior to our personal activity; it orientates this activity towards its true supernatural end and renders it fruitful. On the contrary, we swerve from this end when we reach the stage of seeking self in our activity, to the point of forgetting the Salvation of Souls and all that it demands on our part. Neglect of little things in the service of God may lead us to this forgetfulness, which renders everything unfruitful.” (Ibid., pp. 462-463.)
“Whoever is daily faithful to the smallest duties of Christian Life, or to those of the Religious Life, will receive the Grace to be Faithful even to Martyrdom, if he should have to bear witness to God in his blood. (Cf. Luke 16:10; Matthew. 25:23)”.
“A second cause of tepidity in Retarded Souls is the refusal to make the sacrifices which the Lord asks. Some persons feel themselves called to a more serious, a more perfect life, to true prayer, to the practice of Humility, without which there are no true Virtues; but these Souls refuse, if not directly, at least indirectly, by seeking diversion. They do not wish to hear the words that recur daily in the Invitatory of Matins: ‘Today, if you shall hear His voice, harden not your hearts.’ Some, who are preoccupied with doing something, for example, a book, a work that would let the world know they exist, say to themselves from time to time: ‘First of all, it is essential to become an Interior Soul; if the Soul is empty, it can give nothing. To do something exterior is unprofitable unless the Soul is united to God.’ To become an Interior Soul, only some sacrifices of self-love would be necessary; God would have to be truly sought instead of self. Without these sacrifices, how can anyone enter on a true Interior life? If these sacrifices are refused, the Souls remains Retarded; it may stay so permanently.” (Ibid., p. 463.)
“Then it [a Retarded Soul] loses Zeal for the Glory of God and the Salvation of its neighbor, the fervor of Charity. It falls into tepidity, which, with habitual negligence, is affection for Venial Sin or the disposition of the will to commit certain Venial Sins deliberately when the occasion presents itself. There is finally, as it were, the firm resolution to remain in this state.” (Ibid., pp. 463-464.)
“Among the causes of tepidity in Retarded Souls, the tendency to derision should be particularly noted.” (Ibid., p. 464.)
“The Derider is himself a Retarded Soul, holding others back and becoming, often without being aware of it, the instrument of the Spirit of Evil.” (Ibid., pp. 464-465.)
“The Derider... ridicules the Just Man who tends truly to perfection; he emphasizes the latter’s defects and depreciates his good qualities. Why is this? Because he feels that he himself has little Virtue, and he is unwilling to admit his inferiority. Then, out of spite, he lessens the real and fundamental value of his neighbor and the necessity of Virtue itself. He may greatly harm weak Souls which he intimidates, and, while working his own ruin, he may labor at their perdition.” (Ibid.,p. 465.)
“In this discussion of Retarded Souls, a most important consideration should be noted: namely, that we must be on the alert to preserve in our Souls the subordination of the natural activity of the mind to the essentially Supernatural Virtues, especially to the three Theological Virtues (Faith, Hope, Charity). These three infused Virtues and their acts are certainly very superior to the natural activity of the mind necessary for the study of the sciences, of Philosophy, and of Theology. To deny this Truth would be a heresy; but it is not sufficient to admit it in theory. Otherwise we would end by really preferring the prayer, to the love of God and of Souls, to the Celebration of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, which would be hurriedly celebrated without any Spirit of Faith, in order to give more time to a piece of work, to an intellectual overloading that would remain quite empty and fruitless, because it would be destitute of the spirit that ought to animate it. Thus we would fall into an evil intellectualism in which there would be something like the hypertrophy of the reasoning powers to the detriment of the life of faith, of true piety, and of the indispensable training of the will. Then Charity, the highest of the Theological Virtues, would no longer truly hold the first place in the Soul, which might remain forever Retarded and in part fruitless.” (Ibid., p. 467.)
What Is Truth? [***]
1. The question is concerning Truth and it is inquired first what Truth is.
It seems that The True is exactly the same as the thing which is [being; ens], because Augustine says: “The True is that which is.”  But, that which is, is nothing but the thing which is [being; ens], i.e., that which is, is simply being; [ens]. Therefore, The True means exactly the same thing as being [ens], i.e., the thing which is [being; ens].
2. It was said in reply that The True and being (that which is [being; ens]) are the same materially but differ formally. On the contrary, the nature of a thing is signified by its definition. The definition of The True, according to Augustine, is that which is [being; ens].  He rejects all other definitions. Because The True and the thing which is [being; ens], are materially the same, it seems that they are also formally the same.
3. Things which differ in reason (conceptually) are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other. For this reason, Boethius says  that the existence of God [Deus esse] can be understood if, for a moment, we mentally separate God’s goodness from His existence. The thing which is [being; ens], however, can in no way be understood apart from The True, for being [ens[ is known only insofar as it is True. Therefore, The True, and the thing which is [being; ens], do not differ in reason (conceptually).
4. If The True is not the same as that which is [being; ens], it must be a state of being. However, it is not a state of being (a state of that which is), because it is not a state that entirely corrupts.  Otherwise, this would follow: “It is True. Therefore, it is non-being (that which is not)”, just as when we say: ‘This man is dead. Therefore, this is not a man’”. .
Similarly, The True is not a state that limits. If it was true, one could not say: “This is True, therefore it is.” For one cannot say that this person is white simply because this person has white teeth. Finally, The True is not a state which contracts or specifies being - the thing that is [ens] - because The True, and being - the thing that is [ens], are entirely the same.
5. Things in the same state are the same. But The True and that which is [being; ens] are in the same state. Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle writes: “The state of a thing in its act of existence (in being) is the same as its state in Truth”.  Therefore, The True and the thing that is [being; ens], are entirely the same.
6. Moreover, things which are not the same, differ in some manner. But The True, and the thing that is [being; ens], differ in no manner. They do not differ essentially, in essence, since the thing that is [being; ens] is True by its very essence. Likewise, they do not differ in any other ways, for they must necessarily belong to some common genus. Therefore, they are entirely the same.
7. If they were not entirely the same, The True would add something to the thing that is [being; ens]. But The True adds nothing to the thing that is [being; ens], even though The True has greater extension than being [ens], since The True would then be more than that which is. This is verified by the statement of the Philosopher [Aristotle], where he says that we define The True as: “That which affirms the existence of that which is [being; ens], and denies the existence of that which is not .”  Therefore, The True includes both that which is [being; ens], and that which is not [non-being]. Hence, because it does not add anything to being [ens], it seems to be entirely the same thing as being [ens].
On the Contrary
1. Useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless. Therefore, if The True were the same thing as the thing that is [being; ens], it would be meaningless to say: “True Being” (“Being is True”.) However, this is false. Therefore, they are not the same.
2. Furthermore, Being [ens], and The Good [that which is good], are interchangeable. However, The True and The Good are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are True, but not Good. Hence, The True and The Good are not interchangeable because they are not the same.
3. Boethius states: “In all Creatures, To Be [being; ens], and that which is [quod est], are diverse.”  But The True signifies the existence being [esse] of things. Consequently, in creatures The True is different from that which is [quod est]. But that which is [quod est], is the same as being [ens]. Therefore, in creatures The True is different from that which is [quod est] - being [ens].
4. Things related to each other, which are prior and posterior, must be different. But The True and being - the thing that is [ens], are related in the aforesaid manner, as it is said in “The Book on Causes”: “The first of all created things is existence [being; esse]”. 
In a study of this work, a Commentator writes as follows: “Everything else is predicated as a specification of being”.  Consequently, everything else comes after being [esse]. Therefore, The True, and the thing that is [being; ens], are not the same, but rather they are diverse.
5. Furthermore, those things which are predicated in common of a cause, and of the effects of the cause, are one in the cause, rather than in the effects which are the things caused. This is especially true concerning God, rather than creatures. But in God these four predicates - Being, The One, The Truth, and The Good - are appropriated as follows: Being [esse] pertains to essence [essentia]); The One pertains to the Person of God the Father; The Truth pertains to the Person of God the Son; The Good pertains to the Person of God the Holy Ghost.
Because the Three Divine Persons are distinguished, not only according to reason, but also according to fact, they are not predicated of each other. If these are really distinct, when verified of the Divine Persons, the four said predicates in question - Being, The One, The Truth, and The Good - are so much more distinct when verified of creatures.
When investigating the nature of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles. Otherwise, both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regression, going on ad infinitum, and thus science and the knowledge of things would utterly perish.
[Editorial Note # 1.] Such a situation would be due to the failure to make all of the proper and necessary a priori, and/or necessary a posteriori, distinctions, depending upon the nature of the subject matter, the competence of the opposing protagonists, etc.Now, as Avicenna says , that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is that which is [quod est] - being [ens]. Therefore, all other conceptions of the intellect must be arrived at by additions to that which is [quod est] - being [ens].
But nothing can be added to that which is [quod est] - being [ens] as if it was something not included in being [ens]. Just as in the way that a difference is added to a genus, or an accident is added to a subject, because every nature is essentially a being - that which is [quod est] - being [ens].
The Philosopher [Aristotle] has shown this  by proving that being - that which is [quod est] - being [ens] cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to be added over and above that which is [quod est] - being [ens], insofar as they express a mode of being [ens], not expressed by the term being [ens].
This happens in two ways.
First, the mode expressed is a certain special mode of being - that which is [quod est] - being [ens] because there are different grades of being according to which we speak when we speak of different levels of existence, and according to these grades different things are classified.
Hence, substance does not add a difference to being [ens] by signifying some reality added to it, but substance simply expresses a special manner of existing, a certain special mode of of being - that which is [quod est] - being [ens], namely, as a being through itself [per se ens]. The same is true of the other classes of existents and other genera.
Second, some are said to add to being [ens] because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being [ens]. This mode can be taken in two ways.
First, insofar as it follows upon every being [ens] considered absolutely in itself.In the first way, the term being [ens] is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the thing that is - being [ens] either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being [ens] affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being [ens] is said To Be.
Second, insofar as it follows upon every being [ens] considered in relation to another being [ens].
To express this, the term thing [res] is used. According to Avicenna , thing [res] differs from being - the thing which is [ens] because being - the thing which is [ens], gets its name from the act of being [to-be; esse[, but thing [res] expressed the quiddity or essence of the being - the thing which is [ens].
If the mode of being is taken in the second way-according to the relation of one being to another-we find a twofold use.
The first division is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word something, which implied, as it were, some other thing.  For, just as being - that which is [quod est] - being [ens], is called one insofar as it is undivided in itself, so it is said to be something insofar as it is divided from others (from other things).
The second division is based on the conformity, or correspondence, which one being [ens] has with another being [ens]. This is possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being [ens].
Such a being [ens] is The Soul, which “in some way is all things”. 
There is in The Soul, however, a cognitive power and an appetitive power. Consequently, the word good expresses the conformity of the thing which is. to appetite, as is stated in the beginning of the Ethics: The Good is what all desire.
The Immortal Human Soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. Good expresses the correspondence of being [ens] to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, The Good is “that which all desire”. 
True expresses the conformity of being - the thing which is [ens] to the understanding., because all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. Similarly, the sense of sight knows a color by being informed with a species of the color.
The first reference of being - the thing which is [ens] - to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect. This agreement is called “the conformity of thing and intellect”.
In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of The True, and this is what The True adds to being - the thing which is [ens], namely, the conformity or equation of thing and intellect. As We said, the knowledge of a thing is a consequence of this conformity; therefore, it is an effect of Truth, even though the fact that the thing is a being is prior (a priori) to its Truth.
Truth, or The True, has been defined in three ways.
Still others say: “The True is the undividedness of the act of existence from that which is”. 
Second, Truth is also defined in another way-according to that in which its intelligible determination is formally completed. Thus, Isaac writes: “Truth is the conformity of thing and intellect”. 
This rectitude, of course, is said to be based on some conformity. The Philosopher [Aristotle] says that in defining Truth we say that Truth is had when one affirms “that to be which is, and that not to be which is not”.  Or, as another translation has it: “That which is, is; or, that, that which is not, is not.”
Answers to Difficulties
1. That definition of Augustine is given for The True as it has its foundation in reality and not as its formal nature is given complete expression by conformity of thing and intellect. An alternative answer would be that in the statement, “The True is that which is”, the word is, is not here understood as referring to the act of existing (of being), but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying, that is, the affirmation of a proposition.
The meaning would than be this:
“The True is that which is, that is, when it is said of anything which is that it is”.Thus, the definition of Augustine comes to the same as the definition of the Philosopher [Aristotle] introduced above.
2. The answer is clear form what has been said.
3. “Something  can be understood without another” can be taken in two ways.
It can mean that something can be known, or understood, while another remains unknown, or not understood. Taken in this way, it is true that things which differ in reason are so constituted that one can be understood without the other.
But there is another way that a thing can be understood without another which is when it is known even though the other does not exist. Taken in this sense, being - that which is - cannot be known without The True, because that which is cannot be known unless it agrees with, or conforms to, intellect. But, it is not necessary that everyone who understands the formal notion of being should also understand the formal notion of the active intellect, The True, insofar as nothing can be known without the active intellect.
4. The True is a State of Being, even though it does not add any reality to being - the thing that is [ens], or express any special mode of existence, i.e. of that which is. It is rather something that is generally found in every being - the thing that is [ens], although it is not expressed by the word being. Therefore, The True is not a state that corrupts, limits, or contracts.
5. In this objection, condition, or state, should not be understood as belonging to the genus of quality. It implies, rather, a certain order. Because those which are the cause of the being (existence) of other things, are themselves beings which are in the highest degree things that are most completely. Those which are the cause of The Truth of other things are themselves completely True, or, said another way, are, in the highest degree, True.
It is for this reason that the Philosopher [Aristotle] concludes  that the order of a thing in its existence corresponds to its rank in Truth, so that when one finds that which is in the highest degree a thing which is, that is found which is, in the highest degree, True.
But this does not mean that that which is being and The True are the same in their reason. It means simply that in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of being proportioned to intellect. Consequently, The True is dependent upon the formal character of being - and hence the reason of The True follows the reason of that which is.
6. There is a rational difference between The True and being since there is something in the reason of The True that is not in the reason of the existing - of that which is. But, however, not in such a way that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept, or reason, of The True. They do not differ essentially, nor are they distinguished form one another by opposing differences.
7. The True is not something more than the thing which is - Being. Being - the thing which is, is, in some way, predicated of non-being - that which is not, insofar as non-being - that which is not, is apprehended by the intellect. For, as the Philosopher [Aristotle] says: “The negation or privation of being is in one sense called being.” 
Therefore, it is clear that everything True is Being in some way.
Answers to Contrary Difficulties
1. The reason why it is not tautological to call a being True is that something is expressed by the word True that is not expressed by the word being, but it is NOT that the two differ in reality.
2. Although fornication is evil, it possesses some being and can conform to intellect. Accordingly, the formal character of The True is found here. Hence, it is self-evident that The True does not exceed, nor is it exceeded by, being -that which is.
3. In the statement, “To be is other than that which is”, the Act of Being, a.k.a. Act of Existence, is distinguished from that to which that Act of Being, a.k.a. Act of Existence, belongs. But the name of being is taken from the Act of Existence, not from that whose act it is. Hence, the argument does not follow.
4. The True comes after being - that which is, in this respect, that the reason of The True differs from the reason of being - that which is, in the manner we have stated above.
5. This argument has three flaws.
First, although the Three Divine Persons are really distinct in fact, nevertheless, the Three Divine Persons do not differ by Their appropriated fact, but by reason.
Second, although the Three Divine Persons are really distinct from each other, they are not really distinct from the Divine Essence (Being). Therefore, The Truth which is appropriated to the Person of God the Son is not distinct from the Act of Existence - being [esse], which He possesses through His Divine Essence.
Third, although Being, The One, The Truth, and The Good are more united in God than they are in created things, even so it does not necessarily follow from the fact that, by reason, they are distinct in God because they are really distinct in created beings.
This line of reasoning is valid only when it is applied to things which are not by their very nature one in reality, such as wisdom and power, which, although one in God, are distinct in creatures.
But Being, The One, The Truth, and The Good are such that by Their very nature They are one in reality.
Therefore, no matter where They are found, They are really One. However, Their unity in the Godhead is much more perfect than is Their unity in creatures.
 Bishop Saint Augustine, “Soliloquiorum Libri Duo” (Soliloquies, Book II (2), Chapter V (5), [387 A.D.].
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ
Latinæ Cursus Completus”, (“A Complete Course on Latin Patrology”),
Volume 32, Column 889.
 Bishop Saint Augustine, “Soliloquiorum Libri Duo” (Soliloquies, Book II (2), Chapter V (5), [387 A.D.].
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ
Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 32, Column 889.
 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boëthius, a.k.a. Boëthius, “De Hebdomadibus” (“On the Weeks”). (Quomodo substantiae, in eo quod sint, ipsae sint, cum non sint substantialia bona.).
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ
Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 64, Column 1312.
 The reference is to the sevenfold division in which Boethius is supposed to have classified his shorter works, as well as to the philosophic group, which met weekly, before which they were probably read.
The work, in which the difficulties in the Hebdomads
are expounded, is “How substances, in that they are, are good, although
they are not substantial goods”. (Loeb Classical Library; pp. 44; 92-93.)
 Aristotle, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book 1, (993b 27).
 Aristotle, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), “Fourth Book of the Metaphysics”, G, 7 (1011b 27).
 Anicius Manlius Severinus Boëthius, a.k.a. Boëthius, “De Hebdomadibus”.
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ
Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 64, Column 1311.
 Anonymous, “Liber De Causis”, (“Book of Causes”), Die Pseudo-Aristotelische Schrift uber das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis, I. B., 1882, IV, 166. Edited in 1882 in Freiburg, Baden-Württemberg, Germany, by Bertram Otto Bardenhewer.
See Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., “De Causis”, Lecture I.
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 21, Column 718a.
Proclus Lycaeus, “Elements of
 Another translation has it: “All other things: are predicated as in-forming the thing that is [ens], and thus they are posterior to that which is.”
Anonymous, “Liber De Causis”, “Die Pseudo-Aristotelische Schrift uber das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis”, I. B., 1882, XV, XVII, XXXI, 179, 178, 191. Edited in 1882 in Freiburg, Baden-Württemberg, Germany, by Bertram Otto Bardenhewer.
Also, see Note.
[Editorial Note # 1.] We added this paragraph for the purpose of a further clarification of the issues involved.
 Avicenna, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book I (1), Chapter IX "(9).
Avicenna is quoted from time
to time by the Angelic Doctor, Saint Thomas Aquinas,
 Aristotle, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book 3, (993b 23).
 Avicenna, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book 1 (1), Chapter VI (6).
 That is, aliquid (something) = aliud quid (some other thing).
 Aristotle, “De Anima”, (“On the Soul”), Book III (3), Chapter 8.
 Aristotle, “Ethica Nicomachae”, Book 1, 1 (1094a 2).
 Bishop Saint Augustine, “Soliloquiorum Libri Duo” (Soliloquies, Book II (2), Chapter V (5), [387 A.D.].
Jacques Paul Migne,“Patrologiæ Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 32, Column 889.
 Avicenna, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book II (2), Chapter XIII (13).
 Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P. mentions this definition as the one frequently used by the Medieval Schools including, and/or found in:
Peter Lombard, “Book Four of the Sentences”, (Libri IV Sententiarum), Distinction xiv, Part 2, Article 1, Question 1. Published in 2 volumes in 1916 by the College of Saint Bonaventure, (Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae), at Quaracchi (Clara Aqua), near Florence, Italy, which is a publishing house for the Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor).Cf. Archbishop Saint Anselm of Canterbury, “De Veritate”, (“On Truth”), Book II (2).
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 158, Column 470.
Saint Bonaventure, “In Sententiarum” (“On the Sentences”), I, Distinction viii, Part 1, Article 1, Question 1, taken from Alexander of Hales’, “Summa Theologica”, which was published in 3 volumes, from 1924 - 1930, by the College of Saint Bonaventure (Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae) at Quaracchi (Clara Aqua), near Florence, Italy, which is a publishing house for the Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor).
Also in “Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age”, XI (1937 - 1938).
Isaac Israeli’s “Definition of Truth”, in “Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age”, VIII (1933), 5-8.
Cf. Editorial note in Saint Bonaventure: “In Sententiarum”, (“In the Sentences”), I, Distinction xl, Article 2, Question 1, and in Alexander of Hales, “Summa Theologica”, page 707, note 5, published in 3 volumes, from 1924 - 1930, by the College of Saint Bonaventure (Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae) at Quaracchi (Clara Aqua), near Florence, Italy, which is a publishing house for the Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor).
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ
Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 158, Column 480.
 Aristotle, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book IV (4), Chapter 7.
 Bishop Saint Hilary of Poitiers, “De Trinitate”, (“On the Trinity”), Book V (5) [190 A.D.].
Jacques Paul Migne, “Patrologiæ
Latinæ Cursus Completus”, Volume 34, Column 147.
 Bishop Saint Augustine, “De Vera Religione” (“On the True Religion”), Chapter xxxi (31), [390 A.D.].
 Aristotle, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), A, I (993b 27-30).
 Aristotle, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book 4, G, 2 (1004a 16).
Aristotle, “Physica”, (“Physics”),
Book 2, 1 (193b 20).
 Avicenna, “Metaphysica”, (“Metaphysics”), Book 1 (1), Chapter VI (6).
[***] Source: “Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate” (The Disputed Questions on Truth). Question I: Truth. Article I: The Problem under Discussion is Truth. In the First Article We ask: “What Is Truth?” (Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P.).
Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., Summa Theologica, Part I, Question 16, Article 3, Conclusion:
“I answer that: As Good has the nature of what is desirable, so Truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has Being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in ‘De Anima’ (Aristotle, “De Anima” - “On the Soul”, Book III , Chapter 8), that ‘the Soul is in some manner all things’, through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as Good is convertible with Being, so is The True. But as Good adds to Being the notion of desirable, so The True adds relation to the Intellect.”
His book, “Gloss on the Four Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard” (“Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi”), was edited by the Quaracchi Fathers, Bibliotheca Franciscana scholastica medii aevi, t. 12-15 at Rome, and published by the College of Saint Bonaventure (Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae) at Quaracchi (Clara Aqua), near Florence, Italy, which is a publishing house for the Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor), from 1951 - 1957.
His book, “Summa Theologica”, a.k.a. “Summa Fratris
Alexandri”, was published in 3 volumes, from 1924 - 1930, by the College
of Saint Bonaventure (Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae) at Quaracchi (Clara
Aqua), near Florence, Italy, which is a publishing house for the Franciscans
(Order of Friars Minor).
Anselm: Archbishop Saint Anselm of Canterbury (Anselmo d'Aosta) [b. at Aosta, Kingdom of Burgundy, Holy Roman Empire, in 1033 A.D. - d. at Canterbury, Kent, England, on Wednesday, April 21, 1109 A.D.] was a Benedictine Monk, Abbot, an Italian Medieval Philosopher and Theologian of the Catholic Church. Archbishop of Canterbury [1093 A.D. to 1109A.D.].
He is considered to be the founder of Scholasticism,
being famous as the originator of the ontological argument for the existence
of God and also as the Archbishop who openly opposed the Crusades,
A Canonized Saint whose Feast Day is April 21.
Aquinas: Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., [b. 1225 A.D. in Rocca Secca, Naples, Italy - d. Wednesday, March 7, 1274 A.D., in Fossa Nuova, Italy], Doctor of the Church. The Angelic Doctor. The Common Doctor. Patron Saint of Catholic Schools.
Aristotle: Aristotle [b. at Stageira, on the Greek Chalcidice peninsula in 384 B.C. - d. at Euboea, the second largest of the Greek Aegean Islands and the second largest Greek island overall in area and population, after Crete, on March 7, 322 B.C.] was an ancient Greek philosopher, who was a student of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great.
He authored books on many subjects, including physics, poetry, zoology, logic, rhetoric, government, and biology, none of which survive in their entirety. Aristotle, along with Plato and Socrates, is generally considered one of the most influential of ancient Greek philosophers.
They transformed Pre-Socratic Greek philosophy into
the foundations of Western philosophy as we know it. The writings of Plato
and Aristotle founded two of the most important schools of ancient philosophy.
Augustine: Bishop Saint Augustine, a.k.a. Aurelius Augustinus [b. Tagaste, Africa, Saturday, November 13, 354 A.D. - d. Hippo Regia, Africa, Wednesday, August 28, 430 A.D.], Bishop of Hippo Regia, Father and Doctor of the Catholic Church. The Doctor of Grace.
Avicenna: Avicenna [b. near Bukhara, modern-day Uzbekistan in c. 980 A.D. - d. in Hamedan, modern-day Iran] was a Mohammadan and the Father of modern medicine and the concept of momentum, plus the founder of Avicennism and Avicennian logic which was the forerunner of psychoanalysis; a pioneer of aromatherapy and neuropsychiatry, and an important contributor to geology, quoted from time to time by the Angelic Doctor, Saint Thomas Aquinas, O.P., “Metaphysica”, I, 6 (72rb); I, 4 (71vb); I, 6 (73ra).
Bardenhewer: Bertram Otto Bardenhewer [b. at Mönchengladbach, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany, on Sunday, March 16, 1851 - d. at Munich, in the German state of Bavaria, on Saturday, March 23, 1935], a Catholic Patrologist (a person who studies Patrology - the writings of the Fathers of the Catholic Church), whose “Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur” is a standard work which was re-issued in 2008. Interestingly, he considered a Patrologist to be an Historian of Dogmatic Definitions and not a Literary Historian of the Fathers of the Church.
Bonaventure: Saint Bonaventure (Giovanni di Fidanza) [b. at Bagnoregio, Province of Viterbo, Latium, Papal States in 1221 A.D. - d. at Lyon, Lyonnais, Kingdom of Arles on July 15, 1274 A.D. ] was an Italian Medieval Franciscan, Scholastic Theologian and Philosopher. The Seventh Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor. Cardinal Bishop of Albano.
Canonized on Friday, April 14, 1482 by Pope Sixtus IV, Francesco Della Rovere [Wednesday, August 9, 1471 - Tuesday, August 12, 1484], and declared a Doctor of the Church in 1588 by Pope Sixtus V, Felice Peretti [Wednesday, April 24, 1585 - Monday, August 27, 1590]. He is known as the “Seraphic Doctor” (“Doctor Seraphicus”).
In 1254 A.D., the fame of Saint Bonaventure had earned for him the position of lecturer on “The Four Books of Sentences” (“Libri Quattuor Sententiarum”) which is a book which contains a systematic compilation of Scholastic Theology. It was written in about 1150 A.D. by Peter Lombard, who was a Scholastic Theologian and the Bishop of Paris, France. This book, “The Four Books of Sentences”, had quickly become the standard textbook of Scholastic Theology. In 1255 A.D. Saint Bonaventure received the Degree of Master of Theology. This was the Medieval equivalent of the modern-day Th. D., Doctor of Theology (“Doctor Theologiæ”).
Saint Bonaventure wrote a “Commentary on the Sentences”
of Peter Lombard in four volumes. His work
exhibited the mutual interpenetration
of Philosophy and Scholastic Theology. This work, and also a complete
edition of all of the works (“Opera Omnia”) of Saint Bonaventure, was published
by the College of Saint Bonaventure (Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae) at
Quaracchi (Clara Aqua), near Florence, Italy, which is a publishing house
for the Franciscans (Order of Friars Minor).
Boëthius: Anicius Manlius Severinus Boëthius, a.k.a. Boëthius [b. at Rome, Kingdom of Odoacer, in c. 477 A.D. - d. at Pavia, Ostrogothic Kingdom, in 524 A.D.].
Chrysostom: Patriarch Saint John Chrysostom [b. Antioch, c. 347 A.D. - d. at Commana in Pontus on Friday, September 14, 407 A.D.], Patriarch of Constantinople [Thursday, February 26, 398 A.D. - Thursday, June 24, 404 A.D.], exiled from his See the 2nd time on Thursday, June 24, 404 A.D., Father and Doctor of the Catholic Church.
Hilary of Poitiers: Bishop Saint Hilary (Hilarius) of Poitiers [b. at Pictavium, Gaul (modern-day Poitiers, France) c. 310 A.D. - d. at Pictavium, Gaul (modern-day Poitiers, France on Saturday, January 13, 368 A.D.] was the Bishop of Poitiers, France and is a Doctor of the Church. He is called the “Hammer of the Arians” (“Malleus Arianorum”) and the “Athanasius of the West”. Pope Pius IX, Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti [Tuesday, June 16, 1846 - Thursday, February 7, 1878] raised him to the rank of Doctor of the Universal Church.
Isaac Israeli: Isaac Israeli ben Solomon (Hebrew: Yitzhak ben Shlomo ha-Yisraeli. Arabic: Abu Ya'qub Ishaq ibn Suleiman al-Isra'ili) [b. in 832 A.D. - d. c. 932 A.D.], also known as Isaac Israeli the Elder and Isaac Judaeus. He was one of the foremost Arab-Jewish physicians and philosophers of his time. He is regarded as the Father of Medieval Jewish Neoplatonism. His works, all written in Arabic, and subsequently translated into Hebrew, Latin, and Spanish, entered the medical curriculum of the early 13th Century universities in Medieval Europe and remained popular throughout the Middle Ages.
Lombard: Peter Lombard (a.k.a. Peter the Lombard, Pierre Lombard, Petrus Lombardus) [ b. at Novara, c. 1096 A.D. - d. at Paris, France on Thursday, July 2l, or on Friday, July 22, in 1160 A.D.]. was a Scholastic Theologian, Bishop of Paris, France, and the author of “The Four Books of Sentences” (“Libri Quattuor Sententiarum”) in about 1150 A.D., which became the standard textbook of theology because it contains a systematic compilation of theology.
This book derives its name from the so-called “Sentences”
(“sententiae”) which are the authoritative statements found in various
verses of the Catholic Bible which he gathered together into a book format.
“The Four Books of Sentences” (“Libri Quattuor Sententiarum”) earned for
him the accolade: “Magister Sententiarum”
(“Master of the Sentences”).
Migne: Jacques Paul Migne [b. Saint-Flour, France on Saturday, October 25, 1800 - d. Paris, France on Sunday, October 24, 1875], “Patrologiæ Latinæ Cursus Completus”, (“A Complete Course on Latin Patrology”), published in 221 volumes [1862 - 1864].
Pascal: Blaise Pascal [b. at Clermont-Ferrand, Monday, June 19, 1623 A.D. - d. in Paris, Saturday, August 19, 1662 A.D.], “Pensées Sur La Religion”, 1660 A.D.
Proclus: Proclus Lycaeus [b. at Byzantium (an ancient Greek colony in early antiquity which later became Constantinople, afterwards Istanbul. Byzantium, which was colonized by the Greeks from Megara in 657 B.C.), on Wednesday, February 8, 412 A.D. - d. at Athens, Greece on Tuesday, April 17, 485 A.D.], a Greek Neoplatonist philosopher.
Synonyms include: acclamation, commendation, praise, testimonial, tribute.
Demagoguery: - noun. Any/all political activity, and/or practices, which seek support for one or more positions under the specious pretext and appearance of truth by subjectively and emotionally appealing to the whims, desires, and political prejudices of people by covertly using various fallacies rather than by using logical, rational, objective arguments, and also by the gross failure to actually include any species, whether remote, or preferably proximate, of a cogent and potent presentation of any, and/or all, individually and factually, easily verifiable objective proofs and statements of common, and fairly-well-known, true historical fact(s).
Interpenetration: - noun. The mutual interpenetration of philosophy and Scholastic Theology that is a distinguishing mark of the Scholastic period. For example, no work of Saint Bonaventure is exclusively philosophical. As such, it is an example of this mutual interpenetration of philosophy and Scholastic Theology.
Tautology in Logic: Tautology is a statement that is true by necessity and/or in virtue of its logical form.
Tautology in English Grammar: Tautology is a noun. Tautology is the saying of the same thing twice, but in different words. The purpose of such redundancy, is for further clarity, emphasis, and also for its unique logical expression, the purpose for which is in getting maximum attention.
Some individuals on the negative side of their Sanguine Temperament, and likewise others on the negative side of their Choleric Temperament, could possibly tend to take umbrage at such a grammatical construction due to their failure to recognize its valid intended impact on the Intellect.
Tautology is also a phrase,, and/or an expression, in which the same thing is said twice, using different words, sometimes in technical logical terminology.
Some Synonyms: duplication, iteration, periphrasis, redundancy, reiteration, repetition, and superfluity.
1. (of a reason, argument,
etc.) well based or logical.
2. legally binding or acceptable.
In Scholastic Philosophy, valid means:
Having legal force; morally as well
as legally binding.
Sound; based on evidence and capable of withstanding criticism.
According to the rules of Logic, as valid reasoning.
Valid: real; True; sound; strong; powerful; well grounded on principles or evidence; able to withstand criticism or objection, as an argument; effective; cogent; robust; opposed to invalid.
Synonyms for valid: bona fide, cogent, convincing, credible, defensible, effective, forceful, justifiable, legitimate, logical, potent, powerful, rational, reasonable, solid, sound, strong, viable, weighty, well founded.
In Scholastic Philosophy, validity means:
The state or quality of being valid,
sound, or binding; opposed to invalidity.